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Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer
James Bullard, Christopher J. Neely, and David C. Wheelock
How did problems in a relatively small portion of the home mortgage market trigger the most
severe financial crisis in the United States since the Great Depression? Several developments
played a role, including the proliferation of complex mortgage-backed securities and derivatives
with highly opaque structures, high leverage, and inadequate risk management. These, in turn,
created systemic risk—that is, the risk that a triggering event, such as the failure of a large financial
firm, will seriously impair financial markets and harm the broader economy. This article examines
the role of systemic risk in the recent financial crisis. Systemic concerns prompted the Federal
Reserve and U.S. Department of the Treasury to act to prevent the bankruptcy of several large
financial firms in 2008. The authors explain why the failures of financial firms are more likely to
pose systemic risks than the failures of nonfinancial firms and discuss possible remedies for such
risks. They conclude that the economy could benefit from reforms that reduce systemic risks, such
as the creation of an improved regime for resolving failures of large financial firms. (JEL E44, E58,
G01, G21, G28)
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International Group (AIG), and Citigroup—kept
financial markets on edge throughout much of
2008 and into 2009. The financial turmoil is
widely considered the primary cause of the eco-
nomic recession that began in late 2007.
As individual firms lurched toward collapse,
market speculation focused on which firms the
government would consider “too big” or “too
connected” to allow to fail. Why should any firm,
large or small, be protected from failure? For finan-
cial firms, the answer centers on systemic risk.
Systemic risk refers to the possibility that a trig-
gering event, such as the failure of an individual
firm, will seriously impair other firms or markets
and harm the broader economy.
Systemic risk concerns were at the heart of
the Federal Reserve’s decision to facilitate the
T
he financial crisis of 2008-09—the most
severe since the 1930s—had its origins
in the housing market. After several
years of rapid growth and profitability,
banks and other financial firms began to realize
significant losses on their investments in home
mortgages and related securities in the second
half of 2007. Those losses triggered a full-blown
financial crisis when banks and other lenders
suddenly demanded much higher interest rates
on loans to risky borrowers, including other
banks, and trading in many financial instruments
declined sharply. A string of failures and near-
failures of major financial institutions—including
Bear Stearns, IndyMac Federal Bank, the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae),
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac), Lehman Brothers, American
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in March 2008 and the U.S. Department of the
Treasury’s decisions to place Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac into conservatorship1 and to assume
control of AIG in September 2008. Federal Reserve
Chairman Bernanke (2008b) explained the Fed’s
decision to facilitate the acquisition of Bear Stearns
as follows:
Our analyses persuaded us…that allowing Bear
Stearns to fail so abruptly at a time when the
financial markets were already under consider-
able stress would likely have had extremely
adverse implications for the financial system
and for the broader economy. In particular,
Bear Stearns’ failure under those circumstances
would have seriously disrupted certain key
secured funding markets and derivatives mar-
kets and possibly would have led to runs on
other financial firms.
This article describes how the failure of a
single financial firm or market could endanger
the entire U.S. financial system and economy
and how this possibility influenced the response
of policymakers to the recent crisis. Further, we
explain why failures of financial institutions are
more likely to pose systemic risks than failures
of nonfinancial firms and discuss possible reme-
dies for the systemic risks exposed by this par-
ticular financial crisis.2
A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS
We begin with a brief review of the evolution
of the financial crisis and its origins in the hous-
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U.S. House Prices Relative to the CPI, Rents, and Median Family Income (1995:Q1–2008:Q4)
NOTE: The house price index (HPI) shown in the figure is the S&P/Case-Shiller National Home Price Index; the consumer price index
(CPI) data exclude the shelter component of the index; the rent index is a separate component of the CPI; median family income is
an aggregated monthly series from the National Association of Realtors; and recession dates (vertical gray bars) are from the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
1 A conservatorship is a legal arrangement in which one party is
given control of another party’s legal or financial affairs. In this case,
the Federal Housing Finance Agency was appointed conservator
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by the U.S. Treasury Department
in accordance with the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform
Act of 2008.
2 This article is based on and extends “Systemic Risk and the
Macroeconomy” (see Bullard, 2008).ing market to understand systemic risk in the
context of this crisis. 
U.S. house prices began to rise far above his-
torical values in the late 1990s. Figure 1 shows
the growth in an index of house prices relative to
the consumer price index (CPI), an index of resi-
dential rents, and median family income, all
normalized to equal 1 in the first quarter of 1995.
House prices rose rapidly relative to consumer
price inflation, rents, and median family income
between 1998 and 2006. Analysts attribute the
rapid growth in the demand for homes and the
associated rise in house prices to unusually low
interest rates, large capital inflows, rapid income
growth, and innovations in the mortgage market.3
A rapid rise in the share of nonprime loans,
especially nonprime loans with unconventional
terms, was a key feature of the mortgage market
during the housing boom. Nonprime loans
increased from 9 percent of new mortgage origi-
nations in 2001 to 40 percent in 2006 (DiMartino
and Duca, 2007). Most nonprime mortgage loans
were made to homebuyers with weak credit his-
tories, minimal down payments, low income-to-
loan ratios, or other deficiencies that prevented
them from qualifying for a prime loan.4 Many non-
prime loans also had adjustable interest rates or
other features that kept the initial payments low
but subjected borrowers to risk if interest rates
rose or house prices declined.
The rise in nonprime loans was accompanied
by a sharp increase in the percentage of nonprime
loans that originating lenders sold to banks and
other financial institutions. The practice of selling
conventional prime mortgages has been common
since the 1930s, when the federal government
established Fannie Mae to promote the flow of
capital to the mortgage market.5 The federal gov-
ernment chartered Freddie Mac in 1970 to com-
pete with Fannie Mae, which had been sold to
private investors in 1968. Both firms purchase
large amounts of prime mortgage loans, which
they finance by selling bonds in the capital mar-
kets. Before the 1990s, Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, and other firms rarely purchased nonprime
loans. Instead, the originating lenders held most
nonprime loans, which comprised a relatively
small portion of the mortgage market, until they
matured.6
When a lender sells a loan rather than holding
it until maturity, the lender has less incentive to
ensure that the borrower is creditworthy. Many
analysts contend that lax underwriting standards
contributed to the high rate of nonprime loan
delinquencies.7 Although purchasers of loans do
have an incentive to verify the creditworthiness
of borrowers, many evidently failed to appreciate
or manage the level of risk in their portfolios dur-
ing the recent housing boom (Bernanke, 2008a).
In some instances, investors may have relied
too heavily on the judgments of credit rating
agencies.8
The banks and other financial institutions
that purchased nonprime mortgage loans typically
created residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBSs) based on pools of mortgage loans. An
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3 Bernanke (2005) describes the “global saving glut” and changing
pattern of international capital flows during the 1990s and early
2000s, and Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) discuss the
role of capital inflows in fueling the housing boom. Taylor (2009),
by contrast, blames the housing boom primarily on loose monetary
policy during 2002-05.
4 Mortgage loans are typically classified as prime or nonprime,
depending on the risk that a borrower will default on the loan.
Nonprime loans are further distinguished between “subprime” and
“alternative-A” (Alt-A), again depending on credit risk. Generally,
borrowers qualify for prime mortgages if their credit scores are 660
or higher and the loan-to-value ratio is below 80 percent. Borrowers
with lower credit scores or other financial deficiencies, such as a
previous record of delinquency, foreclosure or bankruptcy, or
higher loan-to-value ratios, are more likely to qualify only for a
nonprime loan. See Sengupta and Emmons (2007) for more infor-
mation about nonprime mortgage lending.
5 Wheelock (2008) discusses the establishment of Fannie Mae and
other agencies and programs to alleviate home mortgage distress
during the Great Depression.
6 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not permitted to purchase loans
that exceed a specific limit (currently $417,000) except in desig-
nated high-cost areas. Further, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require
minimum documentation and other standards on the loans they
purchase, and hence they purchase relatively few nonprime loans.
7 Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) and Bhardwaj and Sengupta
(2008) provide alternative perspectives on the role of lax under-
writing of nonprime loans.
8 Critics charge that the rating agencies had a conflict of interest
because bond issuers paid for the ratings (New York Times, 2007;
Fons, 2008a,b). In addition, the rating agencies used inadequate
risk models that did not account for a possibility of a serious drop
in housing prices. See Fons (2008a,b).RMBS redistributes the income stream from the
underlying mortgage pool among bonds that differ
by the seniority of their claim. Sometimes addi-
tional securities, known as collateralized mort-
gage obligations (CMOs) or collateralized debt
obligations, are created by combining multiple
RMBSs (or parts of RMBSs) and then selling por-
tions of the income streams derived from the mort-
gage pool or RMBSs to investors with different
appetites for risk.
The securities rating agencies assigned high
ratings to many of the mortgage-related securities
created to finance purchases of nonprime loans.
As long as house prices were rising, most non-
prime loans performed well because borrowers
were usually able to refinance or sell their house—
at a higher price—if they were unable to make
their loan payments.9 When house prices began
to fall, many borrowers found that they owed
more on their house than it was worth. This situ-
ation made it impossible for some borrowers to
repay their loan by selling their house or refinanc-
ing their mortgage, and it also created an incentive
simply to default. Consequently, loan defaults and
foreclosures rose sharply, as shown in Figure 2,
which plots data on the percentage of home mort-
gages entering foreclosure in a given quarter and
the year-over-year percentage change in the S&P/
Case-Shiller National Home Price Index.
Rising loan delinquencies caused many RMBSs
and CMOs backed by home mortgage loans to
default, and investment banks and other investors
that held large portfolios of RMBSs and CMOs
experienced substantial losses. Ultimately, the
decline in house prices and the increase in mort-
gage loan defaults that began in 2006 were the
root cause of the financial crisis. The following
sections explore how systemic risks caused losses
on nonprime mortgages and mortgage-related
securities to disrupt the entire financial system.
9 Most nonprime loan originations were refinances of existing
mortgages in which borrowers withdrew accumulated equity from
their homes (a phenomenon known as a “cash-out” refinance).
See Bhardwaj and Sengupta (2009).
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U.S. House Price Index
New Foreclosures Started (percent)  U.S. House Prices (year/year percent change)
Figure 2
U.S. House Prices and Foreclosures
NOTE: Foreclosures data are from the Mortgage Bankers Association; the house price index (HPI) is the S&P/Case-Shiller National
Home Price Index. Vertical gray bars indicate recessions.SYSTEMIC RISK
Systemic Risk, Counterparty Risk, and
Asymmetric Information
In the recent financial crisis, the most impor-
tant type of risk to the financial system has been
“counterparty risk,” which is also known as
“default risk.”10 Counterparty risk is the danger
that a party to a financial contract will fail to live
up to its obligations.
Counterparty risk exists in large part because
of asymmetric information. Individuals and firms
typically know more about their own financial
condition and prospects than do other individuals
and firms. Much of the recent concern about sys-
temic risk has focused on investment banks that
deal in complex financial contracts. Consider the
following example: Suppose Bank A purchases
an option from Bank B to hedge the risk of a
change in the term structure of interest rates. If
Bank B later fails, perhaps because of bad invest-
ments in home mortgages, then the option sold
by Bank B may lose value or even become worth-
less. Thus, Bank A—which thought it was care-
fully hedging its risk—is adversely affected by
Bank B’s problems in housing markets.
Of course, financial firms can protect them-
selves to some degree in such simple situations.
The logic of self-interested behavior combined
with market clearing would lead to an appropriate
pricing of risk; Bank A would have considered
the possibility of the failure of Bank B and taken
this into account in its contingency plan. For
example, Bank A might require Bank B to post
collateral to protect the value of the option in case
Bank B failed. But in actual financial markets,
arrangements are so complex that the nature of
risk that firms face might not be obvious. In addi-
tion, the value of collateral fluctuates and thus
even carefully collateralized deals are subject to
some risk.11
Systemic Risk and Information Cascades
Sophisticated investors and counterparties
will cease to do business with a firm once the
firm’s weak condition becomes known, as they
did with Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. How  -
ever, the inability to sort perfectly among good
and bad risks can lead banks and other investors
to pull away from nearly all lending during a crisis.
The tendency of lenders to seek safe investments
during a crisis explains why trading in risky assets
declined sharply and their market yields rose
relative to yields on federal government debt
during 2007-08.
Sometimes all firms in an industry are “tarred
by the same brush” and one firm’s failure leads
investors to shun an entire industry. For example,
before the introduction of federal deposit insur-
ance in 1933, the failure of individual banks some-
times caused the public to shift a large portion
of its funds from bank deposits into cash. Why
should the failure of a single firm cause the public
to suspect an entire industry? Again, the answer
is related to the fact that people have imperfect
information. Because depositors lack complete
information about the condition of their bank, the
failure of one bank can trigger mass withdrawals
by depositors of other banks to avoid losses in the
event their own bank fails. Indeed, even if a par-
ticular depositor believed that his bank was fun-
damentally sound, it would still make sense for
him to withdraw his money if he thought that
withdrawals by other depositors might cause the
bank to fail. Banking panics are especially danger-
ous because large-scale deposit withdrawals can
make bank failures more likely, as well as cause
banks to reduce their lending in an effort to boost
liquidity. Several severe banking panics during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
resulted in widespread bank failures, financial
distress, and economic contractions.12
Federal deposit insurance has largely ended
the problem of banking panics. When IndyMac
Bank was rumored to be near failure in 2008,
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10 Taylor (2009) argues that the financial crisis was associated mainly
with an increase in counterparty risk and not a shortage of liquidity.
11 Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Pintus and Wen (2008) discuss
how procyclical fluctuations in the value of collateral can exacer-
bate financial booms and busts and contribute to macroeconomic
fluctuations.
12 Calomiris and Gorton (2000), Dwyer and Gilbert (1989), and
Wicker (2000) are among the numerous studies of the causes and
effects of U.S. banking panics. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) pro-
vide an important theoretical analysis of banking panics.many depositors withdrew their funds from the
bank. However, rather than holding their funds
as cash, IndyMac’s depositors merely moved their
deposits to other banks. Similarly, the run on
IndyMac did not trigger mass deposit withdrawals
at other banks.
Panic-like phenomena have occurred during
the recent financial crisis, however. For example,
when the Reserve Primary Fund, a large money
market mutual fund, halted investor redemptions
after the net asset value of its shares fell below
$1 in September 2008, share redemptions rose
sharply at other money market mutual funds.
Although most money market mutual funds had
ample reserves and good assets, investors inter-
preted the troubles of the Reserve Primary Fund
(which held a large amount of Lehman Brothers
debt) as a possible indicator of problems at other
mutual funds. The federal government quickly
guaranteed the value of existing accounts in
money market mutual funds to discourage panic
withdrawals from such funds.
The dramatic declines in trading volume and
liquidity in the markets for mortgage-related
securities during the recent financial crisis also
reflected investor panic. Trading in all RMBSs
declined sharply when defaults and ratings down-
grades made investors wary of RMBSs in general.
Heavy reliance by investors on the evaluation
of mortgage instruments by the rating agencies
may have exacerbated swings in market liquidity.
For example, a ratings downgrade, especially of
a previously highly rated security, could induce
panic selling by signaling possible downgrades or
losses on similar securities. Ratings downgrades
and declining asset values can also force borrow-
ers to post additional collateral to maintain a given
level of borrowing. AIG collapsed in September
2008 when it was unable to raise additional col-
lateral in the wake of a downgrade of its debt rating
(Son, 2008). In general, deterioration in the col-
lateral value of borrower assets was an important
amplification mechanism during the recent finan-
cial crisis. Falling asset prices caused lenders to
demand more collateral, which caused borrowers
to dump risky assets, thereby exacerbating declines
in their market values and leading to further
demands for more collateral (Brunnermeier, 2008).
Why the Financial System Is Special
Many aspects of systemic risk are not unique
to financial institutions or markets. The failure
of a nonfinancial firm, such as an automobile
manufacturer, will affect the firm’s suppliers and
dealerships, as well as the local economies where
manufacturing plants and other operations are
located. By the same token, a default by an air-
line company on its debt obligations might cause
investors to shun the debt of other airline com-
panies if investors believe that the default reflected
an industry-wide problem, such as rising fuel
prices. Still, over the past decade, some very large
firms have failed, including Enron, WorldCom,
and several major airlines, yet none caused sig-
nificant problems beyond its immediate share-
holders, employees, suppliers, and customers.
The failure of a nonfinancial firm would rarely
threaten the solvency of a competitor, let alone
significantly affect the economy more broadly.
Instead, the failure of a large firm could increase
the market shares and profitability of the remain-
ing firms in an industry, as well as provide oppor-
tunities for smaller firms to enter previously
inaccessible markets.
Why do we think the failure of a large finan-
cial firm presents systemic risks that the failure
of a nonfinancial firm does not? There are at least
three reasons.
The first is interconnectedness. In the normal
course of business, large commercial and invest-
ment banks lend and trade with each other through
interbank lending and deposit markets, transac-
tions in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, and
wholesale payment and settlement systems.
Settlement risk—the risk that one party to a finan-
cial transaction will default after the other party
has delivered—is a major concern for large finan-
cial institutions whose daily exposures routinely
run into many billions of dollars. The lightning
speed of financial transactions and the complex
structures of many banks and securities firms
make it especially difficult for a firm to fully moni-
tor the counterparties with which it deals, let
alone the counterparties of counterparties. The
rapid failure of a seemingly strong bank could
potentially expose other firms to large losses.
Bullard, Neely, Wheelock
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affected bank can be exposed through their deal-
ings with affected third parties.13
A second reason why the financial sector is
especially vulnerable to systemic risk is leverage.
Compared with most nonfinancial firms, banks
and other financial institutions are highly lever-
aged—that is, they fund a substantial portion of
their assets by issuing debt rather than selling
equity. During the housing boom, many banks,
hedge funds, and other firms that invested heav-
ily in mortgage-related securities financed their
holdings by borrowing heavily in debt markets.
Investment banks were especially highly lever-
aged before the crisis, with debt-to-equity ratios
of approximately 25 to 1. That is, for every dollar
of equity, investment banks issued an average of
$25 of debt. By comparison, commercial banks,
which are subject to minimum capital require-
ments, had leverage ratios of approximately 12
to 1.14 High leverage meant that financial firms
enjoyed high rates of return on equity when times
were good but also a high risk of failing when
markets turned against them.
Because investment banks held a mere $4 of
equity for every $100 of assets on their balance
sheets, a relatively modest (4 percent) decline in
the value of an investment bank’s assets would
wipe out the bank’s equity, forcing it to raise addi-
tional capital and/or sell some of its assets. Many
investment banks and other financial institutions
sustained large losses on their portfolios of RMBSs
and were forced to raise additional capital to
remain solvent. Similarly, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac ran into financial difficulties in part because
of their extreme leverage. The federal government
placed both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into
conservatorship in July 2008 because losses on
their portfolios of mortgages and RMBSs drove
the firms to the brink of insolvency. Had those
firms held more capital, they could have with-
stood larger losses without becoming insolvent.
A third reason why the financial sector is
especially vulnerable to systemic risk is the ten-
dency of financial firms to finance their holdings
of relatively illiquid long-term assets with short-
term debt. Not only are financial institutions typi-
cally highly leveraged, but the nature of their
business entails an inherent mismatch in the
maturities of their assets and liabilities that can
make them vulnerable to interest rate or liquidity
shocks. Most financial intermediaries borrow
short and lend long—that is, they fund long-term,
relatively illiquid investments with short-term
debt. For example, commercial banks tradition-
ally have used demand deposits, which deposi-
tors can withdraw at any time, to fund loans and
other long-term investments. Many investment
banks and securities firms rely heavily on com-
mercial paper, repurchase agreements (repos),15
and other short-term funding sources to finance
long-term investments. If depositors suddenly pull
their funds from a commercial bank or lenders
refuse to purchase a securities firm’s commercial
paper or repos, the bank or securities firm could
be forced into bankruptcy. Bear Stearns collapsed
when investors refused to purchase the firm’s
short-term debt. Other firms faced sharply higher
funding costs in 2007-08 as markets reevaluated
the creditworthiness of borrowers. The speed with
which the markets can “turn off the tap” makes
financial institutions especially vulnerable to
temporary disruptions of liquidity in financial
markets.16
MITIGATING SYSTEMIC RISK
Recognizing the problem of systemic risk,
financial firms have long cooperated to limit risks
associated with the failures of other financial
firms. For example, before the creation of the
Federal Reserve System in 1913, commercial
banks devised clearinghouse arrangements in an
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13 Lagunoff and Schreft (2001) present a model in which a financial
crisis can arise as losses spread among firms whose portfolios are
linked to those of other firms.
14 See Economic Report of the President (2009, p. 71).
15 A repo is a trade in which one party agrees to sell securities to a
second party and to buy those securities back at a prespecified
price and date. It amounts to collateralized borrowing.
16 Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009) present a model that can
explain a sudden collapse of liquidity in a financial market asso-
ciated with a change in the information structure of the assets
traded in the market.attempt to protect themselves from banking pan-
ics. The primary purpose of a clearinghouse is to
clear checks and other forms of payment among
member banks. In the nineteenth century, clearing-
houses developed mechanisms to protect their
members from banking panics and to provide
additional liquidity for banks facing deposit runs.
For example, clearinghouse members could bor-
row certificates to settle their balances with other
member banks in lieu of cash or other reserves.
Further, clearinghouse members collectively
guarantee the payment obligations of members
threatened by deposit withdrawals.17
Financial market exchanges, such as the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, are also private
arrangements that limit systemic risks. Securities
and commodities exchanges arose centuries ago
to settle trades efficiently under clear, fixed rules.
Exchanges are the central counterparty to every
transaction. Like bank clearinghouses, exchanges
reduce default risk by requiring their members
to meet minimum capital and disclosure require-
ments. If a member of the exchange does default,
the other members bear that firm’s obligations
according to the exchange’s loss-sharing rules.
Thus, membership requirements and loss-sharing
arrangements lessen the risk that default by one
firm will adversely affect other members of the
exchange.
Many derivatives trade in OTC markets, which
consist of financial institutions doing business
directly with each other rather than through an
exchange. Many analysts have identified weak-
nesses in OTC derivatives markets, especially in
the market for credit default swaps, as important
contributors to the recent financial crisis.18
The use of credit default swaps and other
financial derivatives has grown enormously in
recent years. Although useful for hedging risks,
the proliferation of OTC derivatives is widely
believed to have increased systemic risks in the
financial system by increasing the extent to which
large financial firms are interconnected and by
reducing transparency. Many analysts believe
that these risks could be substantially reduced
by establishing a central exchange or clearing-
house for derivatives trading.19 Because exchange-
traded derivatives are standardized contracts that
are traded among many parties every day, they
could be valued more precisely than the custom
products traded among individual firms on OTC
markets. In addition, the requirement for exchange
participants to post margins against potential
losses and mark positions to market daily would
help reduce counterparty risks. Exchange partici-
pants that cannot cover their losses will have their
positions closed out before the losses become
too large.
Cooperative arrangements, such as clearing-
houses and exchanges, are one way of reducing
systemic risks. However, in many circumstances
private measures might be insufficient to amelio-
rate systemic risk. For example, individual firms
could be reluctant to reveal private business
information to competitors, which might impair
a loss-sharing agreement. Further, firms often have
little incentive to mitigate costs borne by others.
Thus, a firm whose failure poses systemic risk
will tend to behave less cautiously than society
would desire and, hence, government involve-
ment might be necessary to limit systemic risks.20
Proposals for Government Policies to
Control Systemic Risks
The recent financial crisis has prompted
numerous proposals for enhanced government
regulation and supervision of large financial firms
and markets to address systemic risks. Many
proposals call for increased supervision of sys-
temically important financial institutions, as
well as new rules for resolving insolvent firms.
17 See Gorton (1985), Timberlake (1984), and White (1983, pp. 74-83)
for more information about the role of clearinghouses in mitigating
banking panics.
18 Wallison (2008) discusses the credit default insurance (or swap)
market, and Schinasi et al. (2001) describe the OTC derivatives
market.
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19 For example, see Bernanke (2008c) and Counterparty Risk
Management Policy Group III (2008).
20 Systemic risk constitutes a “negative externality” in the sense that
the actions of one firm harm others. The situation is analogous to
a firm that pollutes the environment. Because others bear at least
some of the costs of the pollution, the firm will tend to pollute
more than it would if it had to compensate others for these costs.
Negative externalities are an example of a market failure that may
require government intervention to ameliorate.Other proposals recommend regulation to limit
risk-taking and to ensure ample liquidity in
financial markets. This section reviews some of
the regulatory and legal proposals suggested in
response to the recent crisis.
Many reform proposals call for the creation
of a systemic financial regulator with responsibil-
ities for “macroprudential” oversight of the finan-
cial system. A macroprudential regulator would
consider broad economic trends and the impact
of a firm’s actions on the entire financial system,
not just the firm’s own risk of default (Bernanke,
2008c). To some extent, regulators already con-
sider broad economic trends and effects, but
several proposals argue for bringing all large or
systemically important financial institutions
under the umbrella of a systemic regulator.21
One justification for the regulation and super-
vision of systemically important firms is that
governments are unlikely to permit such firms
to fail, or if they do fail, the government will sub-
stantially protect many, if not all, of the firm’s
creditors from loss. Such a government guaran-
tee—either explicit or implicit—can encourage
firms to take greater risks than they otherwise
would, which increases the likelihood of their
failure.22 Consequently, regulation and supervi-
sion is required to offset the incentive to take
excessive risk.
Federal deposit insurance is one example of
a government guarantee that can encourage
excessive risk-taking. Without deposit insurance,
rational, fully informed depositors would require
banks with risky assets to hold more capital or pay
higher deposit rates than banks with less-risky
assets. However, with insurance, depositors have
little incentive to monitor the risks their banks
take; hence, deposit insurance gives banks an
incentive to assume greater risks than they other-
wise would.23
Whereas deposit insurance is an explicit
guarantee, the public’s expectation that the federal
government would stand behind the liabilities of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is an example of
an implicit guarantee. The perception that the
government would guarantee the liabilities of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enabled those firms
to borrow at relatively low interest rates to fund
their purchases of mortgages and RMBSs, includ-
ing securities backed by nonprime mortgages.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac grew rapidly and
operated with much lower capital ratios than
other financial firms. Ultimately, financial losses
eroded their thin capital cushions and pushed
both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to the brink of
failure before they were placed into government
conservatorship.24
Many policymakers and analysts have called
for new rules for shutting down large financial
firms that become insolvent. The current bank-
ruptcy regime is widely criticized as inadequate
for dealing with failures of systemically important
financial institutions.25 Delays and uncertainties
inherent in the bankruptcy process of a systemi-
cally important firm could precipitate or exacer-
bate a financial crisis.
Several reform proposals advocate subjecting
nonbank financial firms to “prompt corrective
action” in the event their capital ratios fall below
prescribed levels. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 already
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21 For example, the Group of Thirty (2009, p. 17) argues that at the
start of 2008, there were five U.S. investment banks (Bear Stearns,
Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan
Stanley), one insurance company (AIG), and two government-
sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) that were
systemically significant and therefore should have been subject
to stringent regulation and supervision. During 2008, all but two
of those firms (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) failed or suf-
fered large losses that required government intervention, and
both Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became bank holding
companies.
22 “Moral hazard” describes the idea that individuals and firms engage
in riskier behavior when they are protected from the danger that
such behaviors create. For example, a person who purchases fire
insurance might be less concerned with fire hazards than one
who would personally bear the full cost of a fire.
23 Merton (1977) shows that banks maximize the value of deposit
insurance to themselves by maximizing their risk. Capital require-
ments and other measures can limit the excessive risk-taking
encouraged by deposit insurance. Many analysts blame lax regu-
lation and supervision, coupled with an increase in deposit insur-
ance coverage, for increased risk-taking and the high failure rates
of banks and, especially, savings and loan associations during the
1980s. For example, see Kane (1989) and White (1991).
24 Poole (2002, 2003, and 2007) was among those warning of the
risks inherent with the implicit government guarantee of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac debt. Stern and Feldman (2004) discuss the
effects of “too big to fail” policies in general.
25 For example, see Bernanke (2008c) and Congressional Oversight
Panel (2009, p. 24).mandates prompt corrective action for commercial
banks. For example, bank supervisors can limit
the growth, executive compensation, and pay-
ment of dividends by undercapitalized banks.
Supervisors can also place critically undercapital-
ized banks into conservatorship or receivership.26
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke (2008c) and
others argue that prompt corrective action could
reduce systemic risks and discourage large finan-
cial holding companies and nonbank financial
firms from taking excessive risks. Further, the
authority to place a critically undercapitalized
firm into conservatorship or receivership would
enable the government to resolve failures in an
orderly way that imposes the failing firm’s losses
on the firm’s creditors and equity holders rather
than on taxpayers.
Prompt corrective action is one potential com-
ponent of a general strengthening of the oversight
of large financial firms. Another potential com-
ponent is a more comprehensive approach to the
supervision of complex and systemically impor-
tant financial firms. Proponents argue that broader
supervision of systemically significant firms might
have prevented the failure of AIG, which required
a government rescue to avoid bankruptcy in
September 2008.
AIG is a large financial conglomerate with
global operations. The traditional business of AIG
is insurance—automobile, life, and so on. In the
United States, state government authorities regu-
late insurance firms—New York State in the case
of AIG. State insurance regulations and supervi-
sion are designed to ensure the solvency of insur-
ance companies so that they are fairly certain to
meet their contingent claims. But insurance reg-
ulators have little or no oversight of the other sub-
sidiaries and operations of conglomerates such
as AIG. Besides owning an insurance company,
AIG also owns a federally chartered savings bank
(AIG Bank, FSB), which places AIG under the
supervision of the Office of Thrift Supervision.
Bank and thrift regulators, however, traditionally
have focused on the condition of the depository
institution rather than on the systemic risks posed
by its parent holding company. The Office of Thrift
Supervision has neither the resources to super-
vise the activities of the entire conglomerate nor
the mandate to regulate the extent to which AIG
poses systemic risk to the financial system.
AIG’s unregulated activities, notably the
underwriting of credit default insurance, created
substantial losses as the housing market slumped
badly in 2006-08. These unregulated operations
had grown so large that government officials feared
that AIG’s sudden collapse could impose severe
losses on other firms and seriously impair the
functioning of the entire financial system. To
avoid this outcome the U.S. Treasury and Federal
Reserve provided AIG with loans and a capital
injection in September 2008 when it appeared that
the firm would default on its outstanding debts.
Many proposals for reforming financial regu-
lation call for the supervision of large, complex
financial institutions such as AIG by strong regu-
lators with sweeping oversight and enforcement
powers that can focus on the systemic risks posed
by such organizations.27 Brunnermeier et al.
(2009) argue that an effective macroprudential
regulator must have the political independence
to impose unpopular measures. To limit discre-
tion, the study argues, regulation should follow
preset rules as much as possible. Writing rules to
cover every possible contingency is difficult if not
impossible, however, and before assigning sweep-
ing oversight and enforcement authority to a
systemic regulator, the scope of the regulator’s
authority would have to be carefully delineated.
In addition to enhanced macroprudential
oversight, proposals for mitigating systemic risks
in the financial system include the imposition of
minimum capital requirements on large financial
firms, regulations on the use of short-term debt to
finance holdings of long-term assets, and changes
to market value accounting rules.
Many analysts contend that extreme leverage
contributed to the recent financial crisis by mak-
ing large financial firms especially vulnerable to
26 Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) and Spong (2000, pp. 84-98) provide
additional information about commercial bank capital requirements
and prompt corrective action. Evanoff and Wall (2003) argue that
the use of subordinated debt spreads might be useful to trigger
prompt corrective action.
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27 For example, see Brunnermeier et al. (2009), Congressional
Oversight Panel (2009), Group of Thirty (2009), and Paulsen et al.
(2008).losses. This view has prompted proposals to
strengthen capital requirements for commercial
banks and to extend those requirements to previ-
ously unregulated financial firms, such as invest-
ment banks. Some analysts argue that large,
systemically significant firms should be required
to hold more capital as a percentage of their assets
than smaller firms (e.g., Congressional Oversight
Panel, 2009, p. 26).
Some proposals call for discouraging the fund-
ing of long-term, illiquid assets with short-term
debt. A firm that cannot roll over its short-term
debt could be forced to sell assets, and if many
firms are in the same predicament, then asset
prices could decline sharply. Such price declines
would impose further losses on firms, forcing a
spiral of still more sales and further price declines.
As the recent financial crisis intensified, especially
in September 2008, firms that relied heavily on
short-term debt faced sharply higher interest rates
as banks suddenly became less willing to lend
and investors fled to the safety of U.S. Treasury
securities.28 Future systemic risks could be
reduced by discouraging excessive leveraging
and the use of short-term debt to fund long-term
asset holdings, for example, by requiring firms to
hold more capital against long-term, relatively
illiquid assets funded with short-term debt than
against more-liquid assets or assets funded with
long-term debt (e.g., Brunnermeier et al., 2009,
pp. 38-39). Kotlikoff and Leamer (2009) offer a
more radical solution to the problem of short-term
debt financing illiquid assets: “limited-purpose
banking.” This scheme would convert all financial
firms to mutual funds so that individual deposi-
tors, not the financial firms, would bear the risk
of the asset holdings.
Noting the tendency of financial firms to
increase their use of leverage when asset prices
are rising and to reduce leverage when prices are
falling, some analysts argue that capital require-
ments should become increasingly stringent when
asset prices are rising. Some proposals call for
tying capital requirements explicitly to the growth
in the value of a bank’s assets (e.g., Congressional
Oversight Panel, 2009, pp. 27-28); others call on
bank supervisors to encourage banks to build
capital and liquidity when times are good and
allow banks to draw down their buffers during
difficult times. For example, the Group of Thirty
(2009, p. 43) recommends capital requirements
“expressed as a broad range within which capital
ratios should be managed, with the expectation
that, as part of supervisory guidance, firms will
operate at the upper end of such a range in periods
when markets are exuberant and tendencies for
underestimating and underpricing risk are great.”
One of the more hotly debated issues sur-
rounding the recent financial crisis is the extent
to which fair value accounting rules contributed
to the crisis. In textbook financial markets, valu-
ations are the considered outcomes of the views
of rational, relatively risk-tolerant speculators
with deep pockets. In the real world, however,
imperfect information and limited risk tolerance
are facts of life that can inhibit the rational spec-
ulation necessary to drive prices back to long-term
fundamental values. Trading in certain assets
might cease during a crisis or trades might occur
at widely disparate prices, making the determina-
tion of their market value problematic just when
the value of transparency is greatest. In addition,
by forcing financial firms to realize declines in
asset prices immediately, mark-to-market rules
might exacerbate a crisis by encouraging asset
sales when prices are already falling, leading to
further write-downs and financial losses.29
The Group of Thirty (2009, p. 46) calls for
applying “more realistic” accounting guidelines
to less-liquid assets and distressed markets but
is generally supportive of fair value accounting.
Similarly, Brunnermeier et al. (2009, pp. 36-37)
advocate a “mark-to-funding” approach to fair
value accounting in which the value of an asset
is tied to the funding of that asset. For example,
if an asset that matures in 20 years is financed
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28 The danger of issuing short-term debt is not limited to firms. Neely
(1996) describes the role of short-term debt in triggering Mexico’s
December 1994 peso crisis.
29 Blanchard (2008) compares the current financial crisis with
nineteenth-century bank runs. He points out that the opacity of
the mortgage-backed assets has served to amplify the financial
crisis by making those assets particularly difficult to value, lower-
ing their resale price, and increasing uncertainly about financial
firms’ solvency. Similarly, the high degree of leverage of financial
institutions increases the probability that any losses will lead to
insolvency.with debt that matures in 30 days, the asset should
be valued at the expected price of the asset in 30
days. Of course, calculating expected future prices
in any reasonable way is difficult and the authors
acknowledge that their scheme would give firms
some discretion over the valuation of their assets.
However, they argue that it would more accurately
relate the value of assets to funding risks.
CONCLUSION
The recent financial crisis has claimed many
victims. Several prominent firms, including Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Fannie Mae, and
Freddie Mac, have gone bankrupt or required
government intervention to prevent their failure.
When the U.S. Treasury Department and the
Federal Reserve intervened to prevent a failure,
their goal was to protect the financial system—
and the economy—from systemic risk.
Financial firms are much more susceptible
to systemic risk than nonfinancial firms because
financial firms are typically highly interconnected
with one another, highly leveraged, and tend to
use short-term debt to finance their holdings of
long-term, relatively illiquid assets. In the recent
crisis, the possible failure of counterparties in
complex transactions created systemic risk.
Financial firms are cognizant of systemic
risk and traditionally have tried to reduce their
vulnerability to it by participating in clearing-
houses or trading through financial exchanges.
Nevertheless, because firms do not bear all the
costs of their own failure, government has a role
to play in limiting systemic risk in the financial
system to protect the broader economy. Analysts
have proposed regulatory reforms to reduce the
danger from systemic risk in the future. In par-
ticular, some advocate the creation of a powerful
macroprudential regulator that considers a firm’s
impact on the stability of the entire financial sys-
tem. Other ideas for reducing systemic risk include
limiting the use of leverage and short-term debt
and revising market value accounting rules.
It is too soon to fully determine the causes of
the recent financial crisis. Asset price booms
and busts that impair the financial system and
the entire economy have occurred before. How  -
ever, the complex nature of recently developed
financial instruments has transmitted the conse-
quences of the housing bust to the entire financial
system and, ultimately, to the overall economy.
Accordingly, many analysts favor measures to
increase the use of organized exchanges for trad-
ing derivatives.
An improved regime for resolving large insol-
vent financial firms would limit systemic risk
and excessive risk-taking. When the government
has intervened to protect the economy from the
failure of a large systemically important finan-
cial firm, the shareholders of these firms usually
received little or no value for their equity and
their senior managers were dismissed or subject
to compensation limits. However, bondholders
doubtless received more compensation than they
would have in the absence of government interven-
tion. A legal reform that permits rapid resolution
of failing financial firms, including appropriate
reductions in payments to bondholders, would
help to create incentives for bondholders to be
mindful of the risk of their investments. This, in
turn, would discourage excessive risk-taking by
increasing the borrowing costs for risky firms.
The economy could benefit from reforms that
reduce the risks to the financial system imposed
by firms that are “too big to fail.”
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